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Lattice-Based Double-Authentication-Preventing Ring Signature
for Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
Jinhui Liu, Yong Yu , Jianwei Jia, Shijia Wang, Peiru Fan, Houzhen Wang, and Huanguo Zhang
Abstract: Amidst the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT), Vehicular Ad-Hoc NETwork (VANET), a
typical IoT application, are bringing an ever-larger number of intelligent and convenient services to the daily lives
of individuals. However, there remain challenges for VANETs in preserving privacy and security. In this paper, we
propose the first lattice-based Double-Authentication-Preventing Ring Signature (DAPRS) and adopt it to propose
a novel privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANETs, offering the potential for security against quantum
computers. The new construction is proven secure against chosen message attacks. Our scheme is more efficient
than other ring signature in terms of the time cost of the message signing phase and verification phase, and also in
terms of signature length. Analyses of security and efficiency demonstrate that our proposed scheme is provably
secure and efficient in the application.
Key words: Vehicular Ad-Hoc NETwork (VANET); privacy; security; Double-Authentication-Preventing Ring
Signature (DAPRS); lattice

1

Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm promises to
change the means of interaction between networks and
the physical world. A typical IoT deployment includes
sensors, actuators, and other smart devices connected
to the Internet. These devices facilitate the collection
and exchange of information for a wide range of
applications. A Vehicular Ad-Hoc NETwork (VANET),
a type of mobile ad-hoc network, is a typical IoT
application. It provides an important technical support
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for intelligent traffic control and improves the efficiency
and safety of transportation. At present, the biggest
challenge with VANETs is how to maintain a balance
between security and privacy. The receiver needs to be
sure that they are receiving reliable information from
the origin, but establishing this reliability may work
against the sender’s need for privacy.
A large number of security and privacy protection
schemes have been proposed for VANETs. They can
be classified into anonymous certificates schemes[1, 2] ,
pseudonym-based authentication schemes[3–5] , group
signature schemes[6, 7] , and ring signature schemes[8, 9] .
In regard to protecting location privacy, pseudonymbased schemes are popular and have been the focus of
extensive research. Unfortunately, pseudonym-based
schemes require constant modification of pseudonyms
in order to effectively protect privacy, and this creates
a bottleneck in the operation of VANETs. Therefore,
pseudonym-based authorization schemes may not be
the best solution for protecting location privacy.
In recent years, many representative works have
concentrated on the use of anonymous certificates. For
example, Vijayakumar et al.[2] presented an efficient
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privacy preserving anonymous authentication scheme
for VANETs. The scheme is highly efficient in terms
of the delays involved in signature and certificate
verification; however, it maintains conditional
privacy. For an anonymous certificate, in order to
reduce communication overhead and to minimize
cryptographic packet loss, Feiri et al.[10] combined
certificate pre-distribution and certificate omission
in order to reduce communications overhead and
minimize cryptographic packet loss. Although the use
of anonymous certificates is able to achieve the purpose
of privacy protection, it needs further investigation to
overcome weaknesses in certificate distribution and
revocation, and numerous problems with certificate
storage.
Group signature schemes use traits of anonymity
and traceability to construct anonymous certificate
schemes. For example, Lin et al.[11] used group
signatures in proposing a security and privacypreserving protocol. The key features of this protocol
are that the vehicles’ On Board Units (OBUs) are not
asked to store massive anonymous keys, and the Trust
Authority (TA) is able to trace a misbehaving vehicle.
The need to store revocation lists is a problem for
this group of methods. Some vehicles need to store a
revocation list in case of communication with revoked
vehicles and, for a wide-ranging network, the demands
on the verification process rise linearly as vehicles
are added to the revocation list. Moreover, all group
signatures schemes have to face up to an important
problem, namely how to select a group administrator.
The group administrator holds great power in a group
signature scheme, but the general assumption that they
are honest and reliable may not hold, which poses a
threat to the security of group signatures.
On this front, ring signature-based authentication
schemes have the advantage of not having an
administrator role. All members of the ring have
equal status, which is better for the preservation of
privacy. Also, compared with anonymous certificate
schemes, ring signature authentication does not require
to communicate with certificate authorities, making
it more flexible and self-contained. Although ring
signature schemes are not as simple as pseudonymbased schemes, they can achieve a higher level of
security. With the development of quantum computers,
there have appeared a few ring signatures for VANETs,
especially using a lattice-based ring signature. Most
of these are based on traditional mathematical hard
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problems, such as the discrete logarithm problem or the
large integer factorization problem.
In this paper, to prevent fraud by discouraging users
from submitting (signing) duplicates, we use Double
Authentication Preventing Signatures (DAPSs) instead
of conventional signatures, where the address a (or
its associated space) can be given some application
dependent semantics. DAPSs are stronger signatures
in the sense that they can reveal a signer’s secret key
to the public[11–15] . In anonymous credential systems,
revealing the secret key is related to the Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) assured non-transferability
concept, which discourages fraudulent behavior. Many
instances show that while DAPS in itself offers
detection, this may not be enough of a deterrence
for fraud. Consequently, by combining ring signature
and DAPS, we provide a lattice-based DoubleAuthentication-Preventing Ring Signature (DAPRS).
Based on DAPRS, we propose a new and practical
conditional privacy protection scheme for VANETs.
Our latticed-based DAPRS has a number of advantages.
First, the use of a ring signature-based scheme
means equality between numbers; compared with
group signatures, there is no group administrator
and therefore the scheme offers enhanced privacy
protection. Second, in comparison with anonymous
certificate-based schemes, ours does not need to keep
in contact with certification distribution agents and
offer greater flexibility. Third, although the proposed
scheme is more complex than a pseudonym-based
scheme, it is more secure and has the useful property
of extractability.
Our contribution: This paper presents the first
secure lattice-based DAPRS applied to VANETs,
covering anonymity, unforgeability, extractability, and
non-slanderability. Our scheme has the potential to
defend against quantum computer attacks, which have
been of widespread concerned for decades[16, 17] .
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section
2 presents some preliminaries including notations,
mathematical functions, and syntax. Section 3 provides
system model and security goals, while the details of
our proposed scheme are given in Section 4. Security
and efficiency analyses are presented in Sections 5 and
6, respectively.

2

Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce some notations and
mathematical tools, and the Existential UnForgeability
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under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) security of
DAPS and DAPRS syntax.
2.1

Notations

The main symbols used in our scheme are illustrated in
Table 1 along with their definitions.
2.2

Collision-resistant hash functions

Suppose that D is a ring Zp Œx=hx n C 1i, where n is
the power of 2. Let D D fy 2 D; kyk1 6 d g be
a set for some integer d and H.D; D ; m/ be a hash
function family which satisfies linear property such that
m > log p=log .2d / and p > 4d mn1:5 log n. That is
to say, if h 2 H.D; D ; m/, it satisfies properties
(
h.b
y Cb
z / D h.b
y / C h.b
z /; b
y; b
z 2 D mu ,
(1)
h.b
y c/ D ch.b
y /; c 2 D
where b
y D .y1 ; : : : ; ym /; b
z D .z1 ; : : : ; zm /.
For random h 2 H.D; D ; m/, if there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm that can solve Col.h; D /
Notation.
Description
Quotient ring Z=pZ
Security parameter
Power of 2 greater than security
n
parameter 
Prime of order .n4Cc / such that
p
p  3 mod 8
x n C 1 is irreducible and the elements
Ring D D
of D are represented by f .p
Zp Œx=hx n C 1i
1/=2; : : : ; .p 1/=2g.
Polynomials
Roman letters .a; b; : : : /
Vectors of polynomials Roman letters with a hat .b
a; b
b; : : : /
b
a D .a1 ; : : : ; am / a1 ; : : : ; am are polynomials in D.
kak1 D maxi kai k and kb
ak1 D
Infinity norm `1
maxi kai k1
Œi 
Set f1; 2;   ; ig
Uniformly random sample from the
x
S
set S
x
Sampling from a RandomizedAlgorithm
RandomizedAlgorithm
mu
3 C .2c=3) log n
m
3 C .2c=3nc ) log n
fg 2 D W kgk1 6
Dh
.mn1:5 C n0:5 / log ng
Dy
fg 2 D W kgk1 6 mn1:5 log ng
fg 2 D W kgk1 6
Dz
.mn1:5 n0:5 /log ng
DS;c
fg 2 D W kgk1 6 1g
Set of integers corresponding to indexes
index(R)
of pk
Random oracle H
f0; 1g ! DS;c
Vi
The i -th vehicle
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with a non-negligible probability, then for every lattice
in D there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that can
solve S VP .L/ problem corresponding to an ideal,
where D 16d mn log2 n[18] .
2.3

Statistical distance

For any function f with domain A which may be
possibly randomized, the statistical distance between
f .x/ and f .x 0 / is at most
.f .x/; f .x 0 // 6 .x; x 0 /;
where x and x 0 are two random variables over a
common set A and
P
jP rŒX D x P rŒX 0 D xj
x2S
,
.X; X 0 / D
2
and .f .X /; f .X 0 // D
P
jP rŒf .X / D f .x/

P rŒf .X 0 / D f .x/j

x2S

2

.

Table 1

Notation
Zp


2.4

EUF-CMA of DAPS

For all adversaries A, if there exists a negligible
function "./ such that
PrŒexpEUF-CMA
A;DAPS ./ D 1 6 "./;
where the experiment expEUF-CMA
A;DAPS ./ is given as
follows:
.skD ; pkD /
KGenD .1 /;
Q
∅0 ; R
∅0 ,


sign0D .skD ;/
.m ;  /
A
.pk˙ /,


if verifyD .pkD ; m ;  / D 1 ^ m … Q
return 1,
else
return 0.
Then the DAPS scheme is EUF-CMA secure, where the
oracle sign0D on input m is given as follows:
.a; p/
m,
if a 2 R
return ?,
else

signD .skD ; m/;
Q
Q [ fmg; R
R [ fag,
return .
DAPS requires a restricted standard notion of
unforgeablility, where A can adaptively query
signatures for a message .a; p/, but only on a
distinct address a.
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2.5

Syntax of DAPRS

A DAPRS scheme, is a tuple of four Probabilistic
Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithms (Setup, Sign,
Verify, and Extractsk ).
Setup: On inputting a security parameter , the
algorithm outputs a pair of public key pk, secret key
sk, and a set of security parameters param which
includes .
Sign: On inputting param, group size l, a private key
sk, a set of l public keys, and a message .a; p/, the
algorithm outputs a signature  for the message .a; p/.
Verify: On inputting param, group size l, a set of l
public keys, and a message-signature pair ..a; p/;  /,
the algorithm returns accept or reject. If it returns
accept, the message-signature pair is valid; otherwise,
the signature is to be rejected.
Extractsk : On inputting param, group size l, a
private key sk, a set of l public keys, and messagesignature pair .a; p1 ;  / and .a; p2 ;  /, the algorithm
outputs the signer’s signature key sk.
The DAPRS scheme must satisfy the following
relationships:
Verification correctness. The signature is accepted
during the verification algorithm phase.
Double signature extractability. If a signer
generates two signatures on two colliding messages
.a; p1 / and .a; p2 /, the signature key sk can be
extracted.

3

System Model and Security Goals
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OBU: OBU is a stationary wireless access point.
Executing the DSRC protocol under which a vehicle
should broadcast a message every 100 ms – 300 ms, it
receives messages from vehicles, verifies their validity,
and sends them to the traffic control center.
RSU: RSU is a tamper-proof device issued by the
TA. Through pre-loaded system parameters and private
keys, it generates a temporary private key and uses it to
sign a message.
3.2

Security requirements

The major goal of our proposed scheme is to
provide an efficient privacy-preserving anonymous
authentication scheme which satisfies the following
security requirements:
(1)
Message
integrity
and
anonymous
authentication: When a vehicle moves into the region
of an RSU, it needs to be authenticated by the RSU
before it issues the safety-related messages. A vehicle
must also authenticate other vehicles before it receives
messages from them. Both of these authentications
need to be done anonymously. To preserve the integrity
of the transmissions, each message must also be
appended with an anonymous signature.
(2) Anonymity: Each vehicle’s real identity is hidden
from other entities in the network. However, TA has
a capacity to obtain the real identity of any malicious
vehicle that may be sending bogus messages to other
vehicles so as to disrupt traffic.
(3) Unforgeability and non-slanderability:
Unforgeability and non-slanderability are based

In this section, we provide some of the main entities
and attributes of VANETs. In addition, we show
some security goals that should be satisfied during
communication processes in VANETs.
3.1

System model

The system model for VANETs scenarios consists
of three entities: a Trust Authority (TA), a vehicle
equipped with an On-Board Units (OBU), and a
Road Side Unit (RSU). A typical structure for a
VANET is presented in Fig. 1[19] . VANETs feature two
communication modes: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I).
TA: TA registers the OBU and RSU, and initializes
them with public system information or private keys. It
has a powerful computation ability and is responsible
for generating the master key and system parameters. It
is also responsible for registering OBU and RSU.

Fig. 1

Typical structure of VANET.
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on the underlying hard problem assumption, which can
be proved by the ring signature scheme.
(4) Deterable-iff-double signature by one signer:
If a vehicle signs on colliding messages .a; p1 / and
.a; p2 /, it can be identified and its signature keys can
be extracted by anyone.

4

DAPRS for VANETs

In this section we present details of our privacy
protection scheme for VANETs based on DAPRS. Each
vehicle can receive a pair of public keys from other
moving vehicles’ messages. When a vehicle (sender)
wants to authenticate a message m D .a; p/, it chooses
n valid public keys .h1 ; : : : ; hn / to form a ring R. The
the vehicle then makes a ring signature  with respect
to .a; p; R/ based on the underlying DAPRS. On the
one hand, if  is a valid signature, then the receiver
believes that .a; p/ is sent by a member of ring R
without knowing which member; so the actual identity
of the signer is protected. On the other hand, if there
are two valid signatures 1 and 2 on messages .a; p1 /
and .a; p2 / from the same vehicle, then the signature
keys of that vehicle can be extracted. In this way, the
underlying DAPRS can be unconditionally anonymous
for the signer.
Our proposed scheme is made up of four parts:
system initialization and membership registration, OBU
safety message generation, message verification, and
extractability of double signatures by one signer.
4.1

System initialization
registration

and

membership

Given a security parameter , TA generates the
parameters .; n; mu ; p; S /, where n is the power of
2 and n > , mu D 3 log n, and p is a prime larger
than n4 such that p  3 mod 8. According to these
parameters, we define D; Dh ; Dz ; Dy ; and Ds;c , the
family H, and S
D, S ¤ 0. We then proceed with
the following steps.
mu
(1) Set b
s D .s1 ; : : : ; smu /
Ds;c
.
(2) If si is non-invertible, go to Step 1.
(3) Choose an invertible si0 , where i0 2 f1; : : : ; mg.
(4) Pick .a1 ; a2 ; : : : ; ai0 1 ; ai0 C1 ; : : : ; amu /
mu 1
D
.
P
(5) Let ai0 D si01 .S
a D
i ¤i0 ai si / and set b
.a1 ; a2 ; : : : ; amu /.
(6) TA selects a secure signature algorithm sig() and
a cryptographic hash functions h.b
s/ D b
ab
s 2 H defined
b
b
by a. After that, TA randomly selects s as its private
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key, and b
a and h as its public keys.
Each vehicle Vi with its real identity RIDi , then selfgenerates its key pair by itself and obtains its certificate
from TA as follows.
(7) Choose b
s i as its private key and compute b
bi D b
ab
si
as its public key.
(8) Select b
t i to compute verification information
Si D H.b
ab
t i kRIDi / and b
ci D b
ti C b
b i Si . Then send
b
b
.b i ; RIDi ; Si ; c i / to TA for registration.
(9) After Vi receives this message, the TA checks
whether the following equation holds or not:
‹

‚…„ƒ
Si D H.b
a.b
ci b
b i H.b
ab
t i kRIDi //kRIDi /.
If it does hold, bi and RIDi are defined as a valid
public key and identity of Vi , respectively. After
that, the TA stores .bi ; RIDi / and creates Certi D
sig.bi ; RIDi I b
s TRC / for Vi with the TA’s private key
b
s TRC . Finally, the tamper-proof device of each vehicle
is preloaded with .b
s i ; bi ; RIDi ; Certi /.
(10) A ring set generation phase. Once Vi moves into
a region which is covered by an RSU, the Vi applies to
form a ring R. When the RSU receives the application,
it verifies its effectiveness and timeliness. The RSU puts
the public keys into the ring, and when the default value
is achieved by public keys, RSU broadcasts the ring set.
All vehicles contained in the ring set can then use the
ring to sign their corresponding messages.
4.2

Message signature

When a vehicle broadcasts messages to other vehicles,
it first construct a message with a timestamp, then it
chooses a ring containing the public keys of the ring
members. The signature generation algorithm is listed
as follows.
Taking a common vehicle Vk , once it has been
moving on the road for some time it will have collected
and stored many public keys of other vehicles. Let these
public keys be R D fb
h1 ; : : : ; b
hl ; S; b
a; H1 g, where
H1 is a cryptographic hash function. When Vk needs
to send and authenticate the message m D .a; pk /, it
randomly chooses n public keys from set R to form a
ring R. We then proceed with the following steps.
mu
(1) Vk verifies b
s k 2 Ds;c
; R is of a size bounded by
c
 ; one of the public keys in R is associated to b
s k . If
verification fails, output a failure result.
mu
(2) For all i 2 Œl, i ¤ k; b
yk
Db
.
z
mu
(3) For i D k; b
yk
Dy .
P
(4) Set e
H1 . i2Œl hi .b
y k /; pk /, where e is in
Ds;c .
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(5) For i D k, Vk computes b
zk
ab
sk e C b
yk .
mu
, go to Step 2.
(6) If b
z k … Db
z
(7) For i ¤ k, b
zi D b
zk .
The signature with respect to .a; pk ; R/ is  D
.b
z1; : : : ; b
z l ; e/. Finally, Vk broadcasts .a; pk ; R;  /.
mu
Note that the signature pair .b
z1; : : : ; b
zl /
Db
z
does not reveal the signer’s identity, so we do not
need to hide the identity of a ring signer using a NonInteractive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proof.
4.3

Message verification

Upon receiving .a; pk ; R;  /, a nearby receiver Vk ,
checks whether these public keys bi in the ring R are
presented in Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or not.
If none of the public keys bk are in CRL, Vk checks 
using the following steps:
(1) For all k 2 Œl, Vk verifies b
z k 2 Dzmu .
(2) Vk verifies whether the following step holds.
‹
X
‚…„ƒ
e D H1 .
hi .b
z k / aSe; pk /:
i 2f1; :::; lg

If it does hold, Vk believes that the message .a; pk /
is authenticated by one member in the ring R without
knowing which member it is.
4.4

Deterable of double signatures

It is necessary for all nodes to find the true identity of a
signer who sometimes signs twice in some cases, since
duplicate signatures can cause higher traffic load.
We suppose that all nodes actively cooperate. From
the input of two signatures  D .b
z1; : : : ; b
z l ; e/
0
0
0
0
and  D .b
z1; : : : ; b
z l ; e /, and also from colliding
messages Ml D .a; pl / and Ml0 D .a; pl0 / from a single
signer, we first check whether the two signatures are
valid. According to the two signatures  and  0 , we
then compute
(
b
zj b
z0
b
i D j,
sj D a.e ej0 / ;
(2)
0
b
b
zj zj is a constant; i ¤ j
and verify
 D sign.a; pk ; R; ski /
 0 D sign.a; pk ; R; ski /:
If they hold, it is certain that  and  0 are both
generated by a vehicle Vi .

and

5

Security Analysis

The proposed lattice-based DAPRS for VANETs not
only has the potential to resist quantum computation,
but also has some specific security requirements:

message integrity and authentication, anonymity,
spontaneity, existential unforgeability under chosen
message attack, and deterable-iff-linked.
5.1

Theoretical analysis

(1) Message integrity and authentication
Under the process followed by the proposed scheme,
a signer generates a temporary private key and uses
it to generate a signature on the message .a; pi /.
According to the security analysis, no adversary is able
to generate a legal signature i . Therefore, the RSU can
authenticate the OBU and detect any modification of
the received signature by checking whether the equation
‹

‚…„ƒ
b
Si D H.b
a.b
ci
b i H.b
ab
t i kRIDi //kRIDi / holds.
Message integrity and authentication for VANETs is
thus ensured by the proposed scheme.
(2) Anonymity
Supposing that a receiver has received a true
signature , every  is a reasonable value in a
corresponding domain. So the success probability of the
ring signer’s identity being guessed by a person outside
the n members is 1=n. The success probability of the
ring signer being guessed by a ring member (except for
the actual signer itself) is 1=.n 1/.
(3) Spontaneity
Each member is able to complete a signature without
the participation of any other members. The resulting
spontaneity is better able to hide a signer’s identity.
(4) Existential unforgeability under chosen
message attack
An attacker can not forge a signature because of the
ring signature security underlying our scheme, which is
EUF-CMA secure[18] .
5.2

Security proof

In the anonymity game, an adversary gets a signature
depending on public parameter P D .; n; mu ; p; S/,
as well as on a random bit b, secret keys ski0 and ski1 ,
a message .a; pi /, and a ring R. All the parameters can
be adversarially chosen except for b.
Suppose that Xb;P ;ski ;a;pi ;R is a random variable
b
which represents a signature accepted by the adversary
A for some given parameters. For any choice of
.P ; ski0 ; ski1 ; a; pi ; R/, the following theorems state
that the statistical distance between X0;P ;ski0 ;a;pi ;R
and X1;P ;ski1 ;a;pi ;R is negligible in k. By using
the properties of statistical distance, our scheme
for VANETs ensures unconditional anonymity under
chosen message attack.
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Theorem 1 (Anonymity) For b 2 f0; 1g, let
Xb;P ;ski ;a;pi ;R be the random variable. If domains of
b
these variables are different from ffailedg, we have
.X0;P ;ski0 ;a;pi ;R ; X1;P ;ski1 ;a;pi ;R / D n !.1/ :
Proof Let X0 and X1 be two random variables.
` C 1 coordinates vector Xbi of the ring signature
algorithm represents the random variable related to the
i-th coordinate of Xb for i 2 Œ` C 1 and b 2 f0; 1g.
The set
Ds;c .ski0 ; ski1 / D
p
fc 2 Ds;c W kski0 k1 ; kski0 k1 6 n log ng

1
2

1

n

!.1/

,

it guarantees ski0 and ski1 2 Ds;c , where n >  and
n !.1/ is a negligible function.
Let
.X0 ; X1 / D
X
1
jPrŒX0 D .˛i I i 2
2
mu
b
˛ i 2Dz ; i2Œ`; ˇ …Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

P rŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/jC
X

jPrŒX0 D .˛i I i 2

m
b
˛ i 2Dz u ; i2Œ`; ˇ 2Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

Œ`; ˇ/

P rŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/j:

As for the first part of .X0 ; X1 /, we have
X
1
jP rŒX0 D .˛i I i 2
2
mu
b
˛ i 2Dz ; i2Œ`; ˇ …Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

Œ`; ˇ/
1
2

PrŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/j 6
X

jP rŒX0 D .˛i I i 2

m
b
˛ i 2Dz u ; i2Œ`; ˇ …Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

Œ`; ˇ/j C jPrŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/j:
P
For any b 2 f0; 1g, 8A PrŒA ^ B D PrŒB, we have
P
jPrŒXb D.˛i I i 2Œ`; ˇ/jD
m
b
˛ i 2Dz u ;i 2Œ`;ˇ …Ds;c .ski0 ;ski1 /

X

PrŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/j 6

jDs; c .ski0 ; ski1 /j
Dn
jDs;c j

!.1/

holds.
For the second part of .X0 ; X1 /;
X
1
jPrŒX0 D .˛i i 2
2
mu
b
˛ i 2Dz ; i2Œ`; ˇ 2Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

Œ`; ˇ/

P rŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/j,

each term in the sum can be transformed to

jDs;c .ski0 ; ski1 /j
D1
jDs;c j

1
2

jPrŒX0 D

m
b
˛ i 2Dz u ; i2Œ`; ˇ …Ds; c .ski0 ; ski1 /

.˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/

has a cardinality negligibly close to Ds;c . Since

Œ`; ˇ/

X
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PrŒXb.`C1/ D ˇ:

ˇ …Ds;c .ski0 ;ski1 /

Xb.`C1/ is obtained by a call to a random oracle
P
P
H. i 2Œ` hi .yi /; pi /, if hi in H. i 2Œ` hi .yi /; rpi / is
adversarially chosen, the probability is 1=jDs;c j. Using
it for all ˇ … Ds;c .ski0 ; ski1 /, the following equation

jPrŒ.X0.i / I i 2 Œ`/ D .b
˛ i I i 2 Œ`/jX0.`C1/ D ˇ
PrŒ.X1.i / I i 2 Œ`/ D .b
˛ i I i 2 Œ`/jX1.`C1/ D ˇj.
/
For i ¤ ib , if b
y .i
Db
˛ i , we have Xb.i / D b
˛ i . Since
b
/
mu
b
b
y .i
is
drawn
uniformly
from
D
and
˛
2
Dzmu , the
i
z
b
probability that both value PrŒX0 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/
and PrŒX1 D .˛i I i 2 Œ`; ˇ/ are equal to 1=jDzmu j.
/
For i D ib , if b
y .i
D b
˛ ib
skib ˇ, we get
b;ib
.i /

Xb b D b
˛ ib . Since b
y b;i is drawn uniformly at random
from Dymu , if this value is in Dymu , the probability
that is equal to 1=jDymu j. If this value is not in Dymu ,
the probability is equal to 0. By the definition of
p
ˇ 2 Ds;c .ski0 ; ski1 /, we get skib ˇ 6 n log n and
b
˛ ib skib ˇ 2 Dymu .
Thus the first part of .X0 ; X1 / is negligible and the
second part of .X0 ; X1 / is equal to zero. We thereby
complete the proof.

Theorem 2 (Unforgeability)
If there is a
polynomial time algorithm that can break the existential
unforgeability of our proposed scheme under chosen
message attack about different a of the first part of the
message, then SVP can be solved for every lattice L,
where D O.n2:5 C 2c/.
Proof Suppose that an adversary A can output
a forged signature for our proposed DAPRS with a
non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial
time challenger B who is able to output a forgery
for Lyubashevsky’s scheme with a non-negligible
probability.
Setup: B describes a hash function, an element S of
D, and has access to random oracle HL of the signing
algorithm. For i 2 Œ`, B splits polynomial sets in
` sets of mu polynomials .ai;1 ; : : : ; ai;mu /. Then B
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initializes A, the associated public parameters and has
access to DAPRS random oracle H which it controls.
Query phase: B answers random oracles and
signs queries of A. For each random oracle query
.xy ; xh ; xm /, B tests whether it has replied to such a
query. If so, it replies consistently. If not, it replies with
H.xy ; xh kxm /. For each signing query .fhi gi 2T ; i0 ; /
for i0 2 T  Œ`, B performs H to produce a signature.
(1) Follow the signing step by generating yOi
Dymu
for i 2 T .
(2) Generate randomly r
Ds;c .
(3) Check whether HL has been called with
P
parameters i hi .b
y i aS r; fhi gi 2T k/, if so, abort.
P
(4) Program H so that H. i hi .b
yi
aS r;
fhi gi 2T k// D r and store it.
(5) Output .b
y i I i 2 T; r/:
Forgery phase: A finishes and outputs a forgery
..zi ; i 2 T; e/; ; fhi gi 2T / for T  Œ` with a nonnegligible probability. In order to constitute a valid
signature, the forgery must be different from ..b
z 0i ; i 2
T 0 ; e/; 0 ; fhi gi 2T 0 / and the forger knows either
¤ fhi gi 2T k or 0 ¤ . Then
fhi gi 2T 0 k0 X
H.
hi .b
z i / aSe; fhi gi 2T 0 k0 / D
i 2T
X

H.

0

hi .b
zi /

aSe; fhi gi 2T k/ D r:

i 2T

Thus
X
i 2T 0

hi .b
zi /

aSe D

X
i 2T

hi .b
zi /

aSe:

for .b
z 0i I i 2 T 0 / ¤ .b
z i I i 2 T /. Set b
z i D 0 for i 2 Œ`nT
0
b
and z i D 0 for i 2 Œ`nT , there exists a collision hash
function H.D; Dh ; `/.
If the event happens with a non-negligible
probability, B is able to solve the SVP problem
using a collision-resistant hash function. That is to
say, B can output a forgery for Lyubashevsky’s scheme
with a non-negligible probability. So Theorem 2 is thus
proved.

Theorem 3 (Extractability)
Given a set of
signing keys sk D fsk1 ; : : : ; skk g, it is impossible
to produce N C 1 signatures 1 ; 10 ; : : : ; k ; k0 ; 2kC1
on k collision message .a; pi / and .a; pi0 /, such that any
two of them can pass the link procedure, respectively, in
which N D 2k.
Proof Suppose that an adversary can produce
0
2k C 1 valid signatures  i D .b
z i1 ; : : : ; b
z il ; e i /;  i D
0
0
0
.b
z 1i ; : : : ; b
z li ; e i /; i D 1; 2; : : : ; k, and  2kC1 D
.b
z 12kC1 ; : : : ; b
z 2kC1
; e 2kC1 /, such that  i and  0i are
l
pairwise distinct signatures on .a; pi / and .a; pi0 /.

Table 2

SR1
SR2
SR3
SR4
SR5

Security comparison.

Zhang
et al.[7]
p
p
p

Wang
et al.[19]
p
p
p







Cui
et al.[9]
p
p
p
p


Our proposed
scheme
p
p
p
p
p

Since sk D fsk1 ; : : : ; skk g, 2kC1 does not belong to
the signature set f;  0 gi D2kC1 . For j D 1; 2; : : : ; k,
according to linkability, we have
8
0
b
zj b
zj
< c
skj D
;
i D j,
(3)
a.e i e 0 i /
: j
0j
b
b
z
z is a constant; i ¤ j
Without loss of generality, consider that this signature
2kC1 is a valid signature on .a; pk / by signature key
skk . From Eq. (2), we have
8
0
b
zk b
zk
<c
sk k D
;
i Dj Dk,
(4)
a.e k e 0 k /
: k
0
0
b
zi b
z ik D b
zjk b
zjk is a constant; i ¤ j
then 2kC1 D .b
z k1 ; : : : ; b
z kl ; e k / D k . This yields a
contradiction to the hypothesis that an adversary can
produce 2k C 1 valid signatures with k signing keys on
k collision message .a; pi / and .a; pi0 /. Consequently,
our scheme is extractable.

Theorem 4 (Non-slanderability) If there exists
a polynomial time algorithm that can break nonslanderability against insider corruption attacks of the
DAPRS for VANETs, there is a polynomial time
algorithm that can break the unforgeability of the
underlying DAPRS.
Proof The proof procedure is similar to that of
Theorem 2.


6

Security and Efficiency Analysis

Let SR1 ; SR2 ; SR3 ; SR4 ; and SR5 represent message
integrity and authentication, anonymity, spontaneity,
existential unforgeability under chosen message attack,
and post quantum attack and Deterable-iff-double
ring signature by one signer, respectively. Security
comparisons of our DAPRS with some related schemes
for VANETs are listed in Table 2.
The operating efficiency of our scheme is mostly
affected by the signature and verification phases.
The final double-signature algorithm only executes in
particular cases, so the deterable of double signatures
phase is not under consideration when analyzing the

Jinhui Liu et al.: Lattice-Based Double-Authentication-Preventing Ring Signature for Security and Privacy in : : :

performance of our scheme. We compare the efficiency
of our scheme with some related schemes on signature
generation time, verification of signature time, and
signature length. Since the cost of addition operations
and hash values are very small, here we will ignore their
time cost here[20, 21] . Suppose that the number of ring
signature is R, Tmul and TSample represent the time cost
of the point multiplications and SamplePre algorithms,
respectively, and TNIZK represents the time cost of a
non-interactive zero knowledge proof. The efficiency
comparisons of our DAPRS with some related schemes
for VANETs are listed in Table 3. From Table 3, we can
see that our scheme achieves much greater efficiency.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we investigated a new primitive. We
provided a new construction of this primitive and
showed that it achieves four security properties of
anonymity, unforgeability, extractability, and nonslanderability. We demonstrated that the proposed
scheme achieves unconditional anonymity of messages.
We conducted security and efficiency analysis, which
show that our scheme for VANETs is efficient and
practical.
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